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JEFF GRIFFIN 
The State of Exception in Film: 
Cloverfield and 24 
Giorgio Agamben, Carl Schmitt, and Waite~. ~enjamin ~~ve 
discussed the centrality of the "state of exception 1 1n the pohtical 
sphere. Despite their disagreements, they all concede in o~e way or 
another that sovereign power hinges on the state of exceptio.n. I~ the 
modern West, the state of exception has become a constitutional 
paradigm.z The current "War on Terror," which declares open 
hostilities on a de-localized, disembodied enemy that has yet to be 
determined,3 turns the state of exception into the raison d'etre. In his 
September 20, 2001 Congressional address, President Bush stated, 
"our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It 
will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped, and defeated."4 The emergency situation becomes 
1 I use "state of emergency," "state of siege," and "state of exception". sy~onomously. 
z Agamben offers a brief history of the state of exception ~n i~ const1tution~l usage, 
beginning with Article 14 of French Constitution of 22 Fnma1re Year 8, wh1ch granted 
the sovereign the power to "make the regulations and ordi~ances neces.sary ~o~ t~e 
execution of the laws and the security of the State (11). Th1s clause has 1ts ongm m 
Napoleon's decree of December 24, 1811 granting the empe:or the power to decl~re 
whether or not a city was in a state of siege, and take ex~eptional pow~rs to avert 1t 
( 4). Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution gave the Pres1dent of the Re1ch the P?wer to 
declare a state of siege and, if necessary suspend the fundamental rights listed m th~ 
constitution (14). On August 3, The Swiss Federal Asse~bly gave. the Federal C?,uncll 
full power to ensure the "security, integrity, and neutrahty of.Swltzerland (16). . 
Article 1 of the United States Constitution allows the suspens1on of Habeas Corpus m 
times of rebellion invasion or for the sake of public safety. Article 2 gives the 
president the titl~ of Commander and Chief of the armed for~es (20): Giorgio 
Agamben State of Exception trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: Umv of Ch1cago Press, 2005). 
3 The Bush Administration's' political use of the word terror conflates widely dispara~e 
strategies with readily identifiable subjects. But his public rhetorical us~ of ~he term lS 
not consistent with Its use in official State Department reports and pubhcat10ns, and 
neither are the definitions in these reports consistent. See Tilly, 2004. The Department 
of Defense defines terrorism as, "premeditated, politically motivated violence. 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience." U.S. State De~artment, 
"Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology, Office of the 
Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, ttp:/ fwww.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm.} 
4 Ibid. 
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an interminable and potential legal operation in which, "the very 
distinction between peace and war (and between foreign and civil 
war) becomes impossible."s 
Before I begin the discussion on the representative aspect of law, 
I should clarify my own use of "representation," as well as my 
discussion of the state of exception as a representation vs. an 
objective reality. I use "representation" broadly to refer to 
conventional media through which we come to know the world, 
whether language, images, or sounds. Because formal knowledge is 
only possible through normal referencing, it is inherently 
problematic to discuss the state of exception as an "objective reality," 
and I forgo any attempts to do so. As Schmitt notes, "There exists no 
norm that is applicable to chaos."6 Rather, I wish to demonstrate how 
fundamental elements of jurisprudence and sovereignty are put into 
play in particular films, as well as in cinematic production in general. 
In its broad usage, the state of exception is a term that signifies a 
purely potential event. As an object of language, the state of 
exception marks the limit point of juridical competence, and ushers 
in a period of action without legal representation. Agamben's critical 
analysis of the "state of exception" makes use of a sort of Hegelian 
logic that couples the exception to the rule in a unity of difference. 
"What is excluded in the exception," he writes, "maintains itself in 
relation to the rule in the form of the rule's suspension. The rule 
applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it" 
(original italics)? In his analysis of law and the theory of 
sovereignty, Agamben suggests that this relationship precludes a 
formal existence of a juridical "outside" or rather, a distinction 
between any outside and inside. In his discussion of the state of 
nature via Hobbes, Agamben claims that the state of nature is the 
"being-in-potentiality of the law, the law's presupposition as 'natural 
law."8 By moving the discussion from the objective presence of the 
signified to the object's potential to be present, Agamben avoids 
describing the "state of exception" or the "state of nature" in terms of 
any inherent qualities and falling into the same trap against which 
his polemic is aimed. 
5 Agamben, State of Exception, 22. 
6Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trahs. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2005), 13. 
7 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller· 
Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 17-18. 
8 Ibid., 37. 
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But while Agamben discusses the state of exception as a politic~} 
paradigm, I wish to discuss it as a cultural .p.aradig~. The reaso~ IS 
that in very obvious ways culture and politics are Inter-formative. 
The "ticking-bomb" hypothesis, discussed below, h~s become. a 
regular academic exercise in judicial policy and ethics folloWing 
September 11th. "Terrorism" and "catastrophe," as spatially abstract 
concepts that refer to temporal occurrences, are made tangible in 
and through the "news." As I will show, they are ~lso made re~l. by 
virtue of a sovereign declaration. Agamben s own political 
philosophy is informed by his earlier work !n a.esthetics, .a~~ he owes 
much of his thought to Walter Benjamin s hterary cnticism. As a 
political paradigm, the state of exception, according to. Aga~be~, ha.s 
become a normal legal operation in terms of its potential. L1kew1se, It 
has become a regular feature of cultural production, as images of 
war, disaster, crisis, and terror proliferate in theaters and 
newspapers alike.9 This corresponds, in turn, to the nov~l me~ns of 
representing war through television and cinema. In my discussion of 
the "ticking bomb" hypothesis, I will show how catastrophe ente~s 
into the repertoire of legal and ethical discourse and how this 
discourse both anticipates violence (as torture) and tries to manage 
and contain it. This is a precursor to my discussion of the 
representation of catastrophe in the film Cloverfield~0 an~ the 
management of violence in the series 24.11 I end with ~ d~sc~sswn. of 
these films as part of a larger fiction of sovereign continuity In which 
the capture, suspension, and ritualization of anomie space become 
normal operations. 
II. 
Constitutional law is always involved in the act of representation 
by codifying norms into legally binding rules. According to Sc~~itt, 
constitutional theorists often isolate the norm from the decisiOn, 
privileging the former at the expense of the latter. s~~h. a~proaches 
misconstrue the nature of sovereignty or even eliminate the 
sovereign" from the theoretical model. "But every gener~l n~rm," he 
argues, "demands a normal everyday frame of life to which It can be 
9 The U.S. State Department lists nearly the same number of "significant terrorist . 
incidents" between 2000-2003 as 1963-1999. State Department, "Significant Terronst 
Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology." 
10 Matt Reeves, "Cioverfield," (United States: Paramount, 2008). 
11)oel and Robert Cochran Surnow, in 24, ed. joel Surnow (United States: Fox Network, 
2001-2007). 
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factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations."12 By 
virtue of its power to suspend the normal order, the sovereign 
implicitly decides what constitutes the normal state of affairs by 
withholding that power. As Wittgenstein reminds us, the practical 
use of language erodes in a state in which normal uses are not 
applied.13 In the Philosophical Investigations, he would devalue the 
import he previously ascribed to propositional language and stress 
heterogeneous linguistic usages in various contexts.14 Propositional 
language is but one of a multiplicity of "language games." To Schmitt, 
the sovereign decision to suspend the law reduces the norm to a 
pure application. The coincidence between the linguistic and the 
juridical stated here is synthesized by Agamben: 
In the relation between the general and the particular (and all the 
more so in the case of the application of a juridical norm), it is not 
only a logical subsumption that is at issue, but first and foremost 
the passage from a generic proposition endowed with a merely 
virtual reference to a concrete reference to a segment of reality. 
This passage from langue to parole, or from the semiotic to the 
semantic, is not a logical operation at all; rather, it always entails a 
practical activity, that is, the assumption of langue by one or more 
speaking subjects and the implementation of that complex 
apparatus that Benveniste defined as the enunciative function, 
which logicians tend to undervalue.1s 
In the case of language, the propositional statement, or language 
as a "picture of the world," dissolves into various semantic acts at the 
level of enunciation. In the juridical sphere, law, in the constitutional, 
normative, or signifying sense, dissolves into a "decision [made] in 
absolute purity."16 And the space in which this occurs in both cases is 
the state of exception, to which we will now turn. 
12 Schmitt, Political Theolooy, 13. 
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophicallnvestioations, trans. G.E.M. Anscom be, Third ed. 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001). 
14 The Tractatus of earlier Wittgenstein posits the "picture theory" of language, in 
which the world Is determined by facts (1.11) given to us in pictures (2.141) and 
articulated through propositions (3.1) (Wittgensteln, 2003 #21). The later 
Wittgenstein abandoned his earlier tendency to contain "meaning" within logical 
pictures. "For a large class of cases ... " he states, "the meaning of a word Is Its use in 
the language" ( Ibid. par 43). 
15 Agamben, State of Exception, 39. 
16 Schmitt, Political Theolooy, 13. 
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THE STATE OF EXCEPTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF POWER 
The state of exception has been a point of frustration for legal 
theorists and jurists alike. Agamben writes that they "se~m t~ r~g~rd 
the problem more as a quaestio facti than as a genuine JUridical 
problem," and they assume that "state of necessity," which f?unds 
the exception, "cannot have juridical form."17 ~nd ye.t, as S~hm1tt has 
shown, the exception is precisely that which gtves ~Ife }~ the 
sovereign. "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception, IS the 
famous opening line of Political Theology. 18 Here he locates the 
originary place of sovereignty in the decision to ~usp~nd the 
normally existing juridical order in an eme.rgenc~ .situ:tion. But 
Schmitt insists on the absolute legality of this decision: Although 
[the sovereign] stands outside the normally valid l.egal system, he 
nonetheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether t~e 
constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety."19 While 
Agamben agrees that the sovereign ultimately decides on the 
exception, he views the work of Schmitt as part of a strate~ to lend 
cohesion to a radical form of sovereignty whose gradual 
exacerbation of the use of the state of exception" threatened to 
disrupt that unity.2o To Agamben, this unity and cohesion are part of 
a mythos of power that attempts to secun~ the r~surrection of the 
constituted order following the proclamation of Its annulment, or 
annex the state of exception to the rule. He concludes that the state 
of exception is an anomie, unlocalizable, and contestable space t~~t, 
in a formal sense, requires the intercession of a "force .of law, In 
which "on one hand, the norm is in force but is not apphed and, on 
the other, acts that do not have the value of law acquire its 'force.'21 
Even more, Schmitt's attempt to maintain the legal status of the 
sovereign decision in the state of excepti~n. is . ultimately self-
destructive, because it hinges upon ~ clear d1sttnct10n betwe~n t~2~ 
rule and the exception: "[the rule] denves only from the exce~tion. 
Insofar as this distinction is evident, the state of exception can 
maintain the "specifically juristic element" of the pure decision.23 But 
when the two elements become confused and ultimately 
17 Agamben, State of Exception, 1. 
1o Schmitt, Political Theology, 5. 
19 lbid.,7. d dd . 
20 He is referring specifically to the Weimar Constitution which was suspen e urmg 
the Third Reich. Agamben, State of Exception, 34. 
21 Ibid., 38. 
22 Schmitt, Political Theology, 15. 
23 Ibid., 13. 
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undecidable, Schmitt's entire program loses its juridical coherence. 
At this point, Agamben offers a reading of Walter Benjamin, which is 
crucial to the understanding of his own analysis of the relationship of 
law and praxis. In his eighth thesis of the philosophy of history, 
Benjamin states, "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 
'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the 
rule."24 This simple proposition blurs the norm/exception distinction 
and thus prefigures the opening of a juridically formless space. 
Hence, when Benjamin states shortly after, " .. .it is our task to bring 
about a real state of emergency,"25 he is positioning revolutionary 
violence within an anomie space where it is juridically indistinct 
from sovereign violence. Schmitt's analysis of the state of exception 
is thus realigned with every such fiction constructed upon and 
suspended within an inherent "juridical void" that is nonetheless 
strategically decisive for the juridical order.26 
Agamben's reading of Schmitt in contrast to Benjamin reveals 
the basis for his analysis of law and praxis. In fact, two levels of 
analysis can be located through his work: the abstract-logical and the 
practical-enunciative. In reality, his thought oscillates between these 
two poles, highlighting a fundamental disjunction between "language 
and the world" (or norm and application).27 On the level of discourse, 
language represents the world through denotation, while on the level 
of enunciation, which refers to the mere "taking place"2B of speech, 
language is reduced to a pure event and signifies before all else the 
fact of signification itself (or the intention to signify).29 This 
implicates a dual subject, who, through a process of both withholding 
and suspension, is solely present in voice or parole, and absent in 
discourse, and who represented in discourse or langue, and absent in 
voice. If a political community is understood as the place of norms, 
laws, or justice, and the political subject as both pre-political and 
politically capable (as in Aristotle's notion of "political animal") we 
can say that the presence of a subject as animal is both suspended 
within and excluded from a political identity within a community. In 
24 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in 11/uminations: Essays and 
Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 257. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Agamben, State of Exception, 51. 
27 Ibid., 40. 
28 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 116. 
29 
---, "The Idea of Language," in Potentialities: Collected Essays In Philosophy, ed. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 42. 
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articulating this bond between language and politics, Ag~mb~n 
writes, "The living being has logos by taking away and conserving Its 
own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting his own bare 
life be excluded, as an exception, within it.30 This is the basis of 
Agamben's thesis on sovereign power and "bare life," in which both 
the former and the latter are "captured out" (as in ex-capere) of the 
normative, political sphere and are exposed as bare-life-as-such in 
the state of exception. 
While the exception is persistent is any normal state of affairs, 
the state of exception is problematic both theoretically and 
practically. Theoretically, because, as mentioned above, it ~resents a 
contestable and anomie space, and practically because It can be 
neither wholly contained nor exhausted in discourse. But insof~r ~s 
the state of exception is originary to sovereign power, It IS 
conceptually available to formal knowledge as a relation . . Equ~lly 
problematic is the conceptualization of catastrophe that Inspires 
"anomie terror" which, in turn, lends juridical consistency to the 
state of exception.31 The possibility of catastrophic phenomena, 
according to Schmitt, is the ultimate guarantor of sovereign power. 
But even he was aware of the problems involved in codifying a norm 
prior to a catastrophic event: "The precise details of an emergen:y 
cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take place 1n 
such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extre~e 
emergency and of how it is to be eliminated".32 This is why Schmitt 
shifts the figure of the sovereign from the constitut~on to the figu~e 
that is delegated the authority to decide, "what constituted the ~ub.hc 
interest of the state, public safety and order ... and so on (1tahcs 
added)."33 And insofar as the sovereign decides what action to take 
in light of a catastrophe, he implicitly decides on the very fact of the 
catastrophic occurrence; that is to say, the sovereign spea~s ~he 
catastrophe into existence. Catastrophe, rather than an objective 
situation, is the anomie potential contained within the so~er~ign's 
person, whose latent or virtual presence guarantees the continuity of 
sovereign power and whose actual appearance coincides with the 
sovereign proclamation of a state of emergency. . . 
Thus, catastrophe emerges from within the soveretgn 1n a 
juridically formless space. From the logical-abstract level of 
30Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 8. 
31
---, State of Exception, 66. 
32 Schmitt, Political Theology, 7. 
33 lbid., 6. 
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investigation, it is possible to construct a formal model of the state of 
exception suspended and maintained within the constituted legal 
apparatus through the spectral presence of the "force of law without 
law."34 In his discussion of iustitium, Agamben attempts to bring the 
analysis closer to the practical-enunciative level. He traces festivals 
of mourning and anomie feasts such as Carnival, to the Roman 
iustitium, a proclamation of a state of emergency that temporarily 
suspended legal prohibitions, public duties, obligations, and 
institutional authority. Both ancient and modern scholars have 
struggled to define the "nature of acts committed during iustitium."3S 
Most often, they invoke the right of self-defense as a shared interest 
between citizen and state.36 At the very moment in which positive 
law recedes in the face of terror, the "law of necessity" ascends and 
binds the self-preservation of the state to that of the citizen. But what 
is the legal meaning of those acts committed during iustitium? Can 
one speak of a violation? "What is a human praxis," Agamben asks, 
"that is wholly delivered over to a juridical void?"37 And, for that 
matter, what are the legal consequences of those acts? The difficulty 
in thinking these questions concerns a crisis of representation and 
marks the limit point of juridical competence. This crisis occurs 
because the taking place of the state of exception cannot be wholly 
anticipated nor represented by law. At the moment of its declaration, 
the state of emergency brings about the end of law as a 
representative, signifying force, and the beginning of pure non re-
present activity. This is parallel to the linguistic act of enunciation in 
which re-present propositional language recedes into "the event of 
language as such, which by definition is ephemeraJ."3B We cannot 
derive a criterion of judgment to apply to the events that took place 
in the state of exception (iustitium), and neither did such a criterion 
determine those events. This is why Agamben calls those events, 
"mere facts".39 Law, as a virtual signifier, fractured from any 
reference to the world, gives way to pure praxis. 
34 {Agamben, State of Exception, 38. 
35 Ibid., 49. 
36 Ibid., 43. 
37 Ibid., 49. 
38 
- - - ,Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, 138. 
39 
---,State of Exception, SO. 
82 
STATE OF EXCEPTION IN FILM 
III. THE TICKING BOMB AND ITS SUCCESSORS 
Imagine this: a bomb is set to detonate in a crowded 
metropolitan area and authorities have apprehended a suspect They 
are sure that the suspect has planted the bomb and have limited time 
to find it All non-violent options have been exhausted. Would 
torturing the suspect for information be ethical in this case, or should 
the law ban torture in all cases? 
The ticking bomb has become a staple for the Ame~ican .political 
palate. The popular media and the scholarly community ahke have 
invoked it to wage arguments for or against the legitimate use of 
torture.40 These arguments attempt, in various ways, to compensate 
for a juridical or ethical lacuna that ope.ns . up in the ,emerg:ncy 
situation. David Luban argues that the tickmg bomb cheats by 
already stipulating the condition of epistemic certainty where, in 
reality, certainty is improbable.41 Allhof Fritz, on the other hand, 
argues that this is beside the point; it is perfectly acceptable to wage 
an ethical argument upon purely idealized situationS.42 Their 
arguments are both correct but not mutually exc!~sive. In .the case ?f 
Luban, the improbability of certain prior conditiOns bemg .met 1n 
actual practice is sufficient grounds for skepticism. For Fn~, .~e 
actual taking-place of the event is irrelevant insofar as the possibility 
exists. In either case, we have gotten nowhere because the event that 
40 This lis t is not exhaustive, but it represents the main lines of discussion: See Alan M. 
Dershowitz "Want to Torture? Get a Warrant," San Francisco Chronicle, January 22, 
2002 2002.: Allhof Fritz, "A Defense of Torture: Seperation of Cases, Ticking Time-
Bombs and Moral Justification," International journal of Ap~lie~ Phi~osophy 19, no. 2 
(2005)., Fritz, "A Defense of Torture: Seperation of Cases, T1ckmg T1me-Bombs and 
Moral Justification.", Karen J. Greenberg, ed. The Torture Debate i~ Amerca (New 
York: Cambridge University Press,2006)., Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About 
Torture: It's Time to Be Honest About Doing Terrible Things.," The Week(y 
Standard 11, no. 12 (2005), http:/ jwww.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/ 
printer_preview.asp?idArticle=6400&R=C80E3672C. Scott ~orton, "How Hollywood 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Ticking) Bomb," V1tal Speech~s ofth~ Day 
74, no. 4 (2008)., John Kleinig, "Ticking Bombs and Torture Warrants •. D~akm Law" 
Review 10, no. 2 (2005)., David Luban, "Liberalism, Torture, and the T1ckmg Bomb, 
Virginia Law Review 91, no. 6 (2005)., and Leonard and Andrew Healy Wantchekon, 
"The "Game" Of Torture," The journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 5 (1999). 
41 Luban, "Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb," 1442. . . 
42 His argument is a purely philosophical/ethical argument. One could obJe~t that his 
criteria are different from that of a legal argument, but I disagree. The eth1cal models 
he uses In his argument are all, in some ways, incorporate~ in the ot~ers' arguments. 
Furthermore, torture is still technically illegal in the US (w1th exceptiOn~ of course), 
so everyone incorporates a different criterion based on ethical assumptions. See 
Fritz, "A Defense of Torture: Seperation of Cases, Ticking Time-Bombs and Moral 
Justification," 247. 
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we are speaking of has never occurred. By this I mean that a similar 
occurrence will never exhaust the ticking-bomb question. To be sure, 
there are real-life examples that seem congruent with the 
hypothetical scenario.43 But the ticking-bomb scenario hovers 
between the virtual and the reat demanding a decision where, in 
fact there is no place of application. It requires a normative answer 
to an exceptional situation. 
Any author who confronts the ticking-bomb hypothesis must 
organize his or her strategies against an "empty space." My intention 
is not to dismiss such strategies outright, but rather to highlight the 
place of frustration that pits judicial prudence against judicial 
efficacy. To take up one is to weaken the other. To maintain both, as 
Fritz does, requires an ethics waged within a purely virtual space 
divorced from both legal reference and practical judgment. In terms 
of its concrete application, however, the question is not so much 
whether the actual act of torture could be ethicat but whether or not 
it can be managed, coordinated, systematized, and articulated within 
any applicable, theoretical model. Matthew Hannah is right to 
suggest that the popularity of and debates surrounding the ticking 
bomb hypothesis make it possible to see torture as part of "a 
symmetrical reversal of and geopolitical response to the threat of 
terrorism."44 That is, terrorism, at the limit point of juridical 
competence, constitutes an exceptional and destabilizing threat that 
is countered with an exceptional response. But it is a mistake to 
construe the act of torture as automatically tied to a given juridicat 
geopoliticat or biopolitical model. When the images of Abu Ghraib 
were leaked to the public, public outrage was aimed at the character 
of violence that took place. In the media, the image of bureaucratized 
discipline confronted the image of excess and sadism in an 
environment in which "Army regulations and the Geneva 
conventions were routinely violated.''45 However, a particular logic 
governed the abuses at the prison that defied official guidelines and 
conventions, and followed more elementary rituals of power 
relations between empowered and disempowered, occupier and 
43 Luban cites the case in the Philippines when authorities tortured a Pakistani bomb-
maker out of information revealing an al Quaeda plot to assassinate the Pope. 
However, they didn't that such a plot existed prior to the decision to torture. Luban, 
"Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb," 1441. 
44 Matthew Hannah, "Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a 
Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge," Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 96, no. 3 (2006). 
45 Seymour M. Hersh, "Torture at Abu Ghraib," New Yorker 80, no. 11 (2004): 47. 
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occupied.46 While the purpose of the acts may have coincided with 
the interests of the state in the last instance (detainment, discipline, 
information, etc.) the means by which these ends were secured fell 
outside the boundary of institutional management and delegation, 
leading to a situation in which it becomes impossible to determine 
exactly for whom the violent acts were administered. Hence, the 
problem is inevitably construed as a deficit in oversight and 
surveillance. In this opaque, unbounded region, sovereignty changes 
hands fluidly and indiscreetly, and the possession of violence itself 
becomes the object of struggle. The ticking bomb hypothesis deploys 
the element of urgency that severs the tie between agent/institution, 
power ;authority, norm/ decision, exploiting a fundamental juridical 
fact echoed in Schmitt's observation that, "all law is situational 
law."47 But even in his own terms, it is unclear who holds the 
"monopoly to decide" in this scenario.48 As a hypothetical situation, 
the ticking bomb situation is always already beyond normative 
judgment, and constitutes a "real state of emergency" in Benjamin's 
terms, in which sovereign violence is ultimately indistinct from any 
other act of violence. 
Those who support torture in the ticking-bomb scenario often 
cite "necessity." But who decides what is necessary, and when does 
this decision acquire its legal force? In normal situations, laws and 
conventions delegate the proper authority and prescribe the means 
(or at least establish limits) through which decisions are to be 
carried out Ideally, at least, law represents these acts through their 
duration. The extreme situation falls beyond the competence of legal 
calculation, and acts carried out therein are momentarily severed 
from legal representation. Necessity becomes a mechanism to 
ensure the juridical continuity of violence, if only after the fact The 
Israeli lawyer, Shai Nitzen, in defense of the state authorization of 
torture, invokes the law of necessity and cites a statute that absolves 
Israeli officials from criminal liability, provided their acts were 
"required to prevent immediate serious harm and there was no other 
way to achieve their goal."49 Even after the court decided to ban 
torture, it still left open the possibility that, in an actual ticking-bomb 
46 Mary Ann Tetreault, "The Sexual Politics of Abu Ghraib: Hegemony, Spectacle, and 
the Global War on Terror," NWSA]ournal18, no. 3 (2006): 34. 
47 Schmitt, Political Theology, 13. 
40 Ibid. 
49 Joel Greenberg, "Israel Court Weighs Legality of What Many Call Torture," New York 
Times, january 25 1999. 
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scenario, an agent could resort to torture and use the "law of 
necessity" as a legal defense.50 Human rights groups argue that the 
necessity defense is only applicable after the fact. Alan Derschowitz, 
while normatively opposed to torture, has "no doubt" that in the 
ticking-bomb scenario the agent who holds the suspect would 
torture the victim. The question is whether the tor ture should occur 
outside the law or within it.51 Requiring that agents obtain torture 
warrants prior to the actual torture would bring an inevitable 
torture into legal jurisdiction prior to the act The difference between 
Dershowitz's suggestion and the Is raeli court's decision is simply the 
anterior or posterior place of judgment. The assumption that torture 
would be inevitable or necessary removes it from the hand of the 
agent while the decision of the court places the torture into the 
hands of the state. But Dershowitz, who acknowledges the potency of 
the ticking-bomb situation, down plays the immanence of the crisis it 
presents . His suggestion, in his own terms, is only applicable for 
those cases in which the ticking-bomb leaves the agent enough time 
to obtain a warrant. And if it is true that the agent would resort to 
torture in any case, the legal meaning of torture in a ll other cases is 
still unclear. In his argument against the ticking-bomb hypothesis, it 
is appropriate that David Luban, citing Wittgenstein, writes, 
"Confusion arises when we become bewitched by a picture."52 But it 
not so much a matter of comparing the picture wi th a given reality, 
as it is recognizing the fact that the reality to which we are referr ing 
has no applicable form: its form is consti tu ted through the taking 
place of the event. Such an event is not an object of knowledge at all, 
rather it is perhaps analogous to what Wittgenstein called the 
"mystical," which merely "shows itself."S3 In what follows, I take up a 
discussion of film in this context. I intend to show how strategies 
waged against the ticking-bomb hypothesis anticipate formal 
elements of film production in general, and the representation of the 
state of exception in particular. 
Where scholars have fall en short of providing answers, 
filmmakers have risen to prominence. Cloverfield and 24 are more 
"complete" answers to the question because, as films in general, they 
50 Dershowitz, "Want to Torture? Get a Warrant," A-19. fo r a fuller accoun t, see Alan 
Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the 
Challenge (New Haven: Ya le Unive rs ity Press, 2002). 
51 Dershowitz, "Want to Torture? Get a Warrant," A-19. 
52 Luban, "Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb," 1441. 
53 Ludwig Wi ttgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosoph/cus, trans. C. K. Ogden (Barnes & 
Noble, 2003), 6.532. 
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are capable of capturing a procession of events that are unmediated 
by speech. Films can show series of occurrences without word~. 
Kommerell, the German literary critic claimed that speech 1s 
"originary gesture."S4 In Agamben's reading of Kommerell, "gesture is 
not so much a prelinguistic content" as it is a cipher of mankind's 
"speechless dwelling in language"55 As mentioned above, this 
"speechless dwelling" is the place in which the elemental voice of the 
subject is captured and suspended, as an exception, within discourse. 
In cinema, the place of representation is located between gesture and 
speech, intention and act Because movies are transmissible through 
a minimum of denotation, they "oscillate forever between reality and 
virtuality, life and art, the singular and the generic."56 They lie on a 
second order of seeing, one that excludes the viewer as participant 
but includes it as spectator. Thus, they are capable of bridging the 
gap between a particular event hidden from formal knowledge and a 
representation already capable of mass transmission. This is because 
reproducibility is inherent to the film's production. The entire 
technological ensemble called into the work of productio~ i~ 
organized upon this task. "The equipment-free aspect of reahty, 
writes Benjamin, "here has become the height of artifice."57 
CLOVERFIELD 
In Cloverfield, as in 24, artifice reaches its limit point. In the 
former, the events play out in real-time, and the camera bridges the 
temporal world of the viewer with the virtual world of the actors. 
The latter involves a group of friends, Rob (Michael Stahl-Davis), Hud 
(T.J. Miller), Marlena (Lizzy Caplan), Lily (Jessica Lucas), and Beth 
(Odette Yusman), whose going away party for Rob is cut short by an 
invasion of monsters, although this is only gradually made clear. The 
plot is driven by an attempt to rescue Beth, and is perhaps secondary 
to the film's presentation of catastrophe. We are (supposedly) 
watching a digital recording from Hud's camera, and Hud struggles 
to steady the camera while fleeing for his life. 
54 Giorgio Agamben, "Kommerell, or on Gesture," in Potentialities: Collected Essays in 
Ph ilosophy, ed. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 78. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., 80. 
57 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in 
11/uminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 
1968), 233. 
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In Cloverfield the camera is incorporated into the fi lm as a 
subject. In Vertov's Man with a Movie Camera,ss the point-of-view 
shifts between multiple cameras. At times the viewer is presented 
shots of the filmmaker shooting the film. The illusion of the objective 
eye is effaced by the ostensive focus of a second camera onto the 
first, and, immediately, a second order of seeing is inaugurated 
before an invisible camera. Using this technique, Ver tov parlays an 
artifice of theatrics for a theatrics of a rtifice. In Cloverfield, the first 
and second orders of seeing are contained within a s ingle camera, 
and the film achieves its illusion by binding the camera, as an 
objective recorder, to the phys iological limitations of the characters. 
But the fi lm can only be seen in contrast with the p resent 
conventions of filmmaking that incorporate sharp resolutions, 
command all aspect of colors, hues, and shadows, and capture the 
most intimate gestures and fl eeting expressions of the characters on 
screen, even as the camera dissimulates its own participation in the 
events. Cloverfield exchanges a ll this for a shaky cameraman and 
grainy footage. That is, Cloverfield already anticipates one's 
acclimation towards standard techniques of fi lmmaking and 
attempts to thwart it. 
Because the camera plays the dual role of subjective participant 
and objective observer, Cloverfield can display catastrophe as a lived 
event. Benjamin was attuned to changes occurring in lyr ic poetry, 
particularly through the works of Baudelaire. Baudelaire wanted to 
guard himself against the experience of the "shock" -- the unguarded 
experience of a moment -- so he placed its poetic production at the 
center of his work. In that the crisis is secured as a poetic 
representa tion, the latter takes on the "character of having been 
lived in the strict sense."S9 To perform this Sisyphean task, one must 
construct a representation that mimics the intangibili ty or 
singularity of the experience of shock (a flash... then nig ht! 
[Baudelaire]). According to Benjamin, photography "gave the 
moment a posthumous shock" by capturing the singularity of the 
event onto an infinitely reproducible medium. In film, "the shock is 
established as a formal principle."6o The consequence of the shock as 
a formal principle of the artistic production is the subj ect's 
58 Dziga Vertov, "Man wi th a Movie Camera," (Soviet Union1929).Vertov, Dziga. 
59 Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Ba udelaire," in Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 162. 
6o Ibid., 17 5. 
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"emancipation from experiences."61 Films radically alienat~ the 
viewers from the lived experience in exchange for a radically 
intimate representation of that experience. According to Robert 
Baird, however, the lived experience is momentarily awakened 
through the effect of "startle" in film, which takes the form of 
imperceptible bodily jerks and physiological reactions.62 In fact, the 
physical "participation" of the spectator in this sense affor?s the 
startle its exceptional status. Baird celebrates the startle as eVldence 
of a prehistoric remnant of Man. If Baudelaire wished to galvanize 
the intensity of a lived moment onto the page at the expense of 
experience, Baird is happy to activate his slumbering biology into 
seizure. They "engage our psychophysiologies, and, for an hour or s.o' 
mock and remember mortality ... as well as "reaffirm the animalistic, 
atavistic and irrational" qualities of the human."63 The author 
separates a form of life present in abrupt, involuntary, physical 
shocks from a li fe that had forgotten its subjection to death. The 
irrational animal is thus confined within the rational human as an 
erratic and primordial effect. The principal figure of both the "shock" 
and the startle is an involuntary subject In Baudelaire, this figure 
anticipates the poem; for Baird, that subject is located in and throu~h 
the film as an exception. In turn, it is re-inserted into Cloverfield In 
the dual role of the camera. Between the poetic work of Baudelaire, 
photography, and film, we see an operation in which the exception, 
as an a-historical, unmediated, and de-serial event is integrated into 
the artistic production as the rule. This movement is characterized 
more by its velocity than its particular medium, and this velocity 
coincides with the spectator's alienation from the events. The 
"physiological" element of the startle at every moment colors the 
film. But the film translates this into objective and visual language, 
formalizing it into a technique. Baird outlines the essential 
characteristics of the fil m star tle effect: "(1) A character presence, (2) 
an implied off-screen threat, and (3) a disturbing intrusion into the 
character's immediate space."64 In Baird's model, the character 
serves as an intermediary between the "involuntary subject" and the 
catalyst, but in Cloverfield, this subject is the ever-present medium. 
The monster is only visible in short glin1pses, and not until the end 
6 1 Ibid., 162. 
62 Robert Baird, "The Startle Effect: Implications for Spectator Cognition and Media 
Theory," Film Quarterly 53, no. 3 (2000). 
63 Ibid.: 22. 
64 Ibid.: 15. 
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do we get a somewhat sustained view of it. The "immediate space" of 
the characters is constantly disturbed by the destruction around 
them. 
In sifting through the archival record of the Holocaust-- perhaps 
the most extreme and sustained example of the normativization of 
the state of exception in history-- Agamben locates a lacuna in the 
testimony of the Auschwitz survivors. The lacuna appears by virtue 
of the fact that the survivors bore witness to an event that language 
cannot give account The extreme figure of Auschwitz was the 
Muse/mann, to whom starvation and abuse had taken its toll, 
reducing him to a near vegetative state. The Muse/mann was the 
"complete witness" who, by virtue of this condition, cannot bear 
witness to the event65 He can only be spoken for by that part of the 
human that survives the inhuman. In the same way, the "imagined 
substance"66 of the /, impenetrable to the discourse that it initiates 
nonetheless survives the discourse as a remnant of the speaker, who 
in term, testifies on its behalf. At the beginning of Cloverfield, the text 
against the black screen informs the viewer that the following 
footage is the property of the Department of Defense, recovered from 
a digital hand-held camera in an area that was once New York's 
Central Park. We are not told why we are given this viewing or in 
what context we are watching it But we know that the same state of 
order that preceded the catastrophe is still in force at the end. This 
recording, held somewhere in an archive, survives Marlena, Hud, Rob 
and Beth. 
At the end of the film, there is a scene in which Rob and Beth 
take refuge beneath a bridge in Central Park. They each face the 
camera and say a few words before we hear a crash and the camera 
flickers off. Presumably they die. If they had lived, the illusion of the 
film, contingent upon their deaths, would have evaporated. This is 
the novelty of Cloverfield: the death of the living becomes coupled 
with the survival of the dead object (the camera), allowing the 
infinite reproducibility of a singular event, and the radically passive 
observer can witness that which even the characters cannot. The 
camera and death bind the characters to both themselves and to us 
at the very place in which the bind is compromised. The camera is a 
more "authentic" witness than a survivor because its objective status 
lends the recording continuity at the point in which subjectivity 
recedes into terror, taking its own survival as its object. Where 
65 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witn ess and the Archive, 47. 
66Ibid., 121. 
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language left a void in the archive of Auschwitz, the camera is 
capable of bridging that void through disengaged recording. The 
objective and technological faculties of the camera hold the 
exception, and the bare life that arises as its subject, in a suspended 
captivation that survives the rupture of transmission. Even a period 
as intangible as a startle, has been captured in studies using high-
speed cinematography.67 Benjamin was hopeful for film, believing 
that reproducibility "emancipated the work of art from its parasitic 
dependence of ritual."6B For centuries art had been aligned so closely 
with its origins in time and space. The criterion of its value was its 
authenticity--emanating as an "aura"--, which was grounded onto its 
physical locus and "the testimony to the history which it had 
experienced."69 Because reproducibility is inherent in the 
photographic image, the image would loose itself from tradition, and 
art would move towards the realm of politics.70 In film, according to 
Benjamin, the aura of the actor is tied to his presence and is 
dissolved in its cinematic projection.71 This is because, as he claims, 
presence "cannot be replicated."72 An expression or gesture 
originating from a theater actor on a traditional stage is manifestly 
different from that of an actor in film. In Benjamin's terms, presence 
cannot be replicated insofar as it is always associated with the 
physical locality of the subject But, as is seen in Cloverfield, it can be 
approximated as a representation through the separation of 
intentionality and act, which is accidental in nearly all films, a formal 
element of Cloverfield's production. In theater, intention and act 
(gesture and speech) are part of the same expression, whereas in 
film (and this will be more clear later) gesture and intention occur 
intermittently within, and despite of, speech and act. Cloverfield is 
exceptional because it incorporates the camera as an unintentional 
subject, which makes possible the exhibition of a form of subjectivity 
suspended at times in pure intentionality. This is best demonstrated 
in scenes of terror and flight, in which a monster diverts the intended 
course of action that is re-constituted, diverted again, and so on. In 
the midst of this struggle, the viewer glimpses a form of being whose 
actions proceed despite of intent, and intent never resolves itself in 
67 Baird, "The Startle Effect: Implications for Spectator Cognition and Media Theory," 
21. 
60 Benjamin, "The Work of Art In the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," 224. 
69 Ibid., 221. 
70 Ibid., 222. 
7 1 Ibid., 229. 
72 Ibid. 
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action. Besides their recent political significance, terror, self-
preservation, and being-towards-death, all describe a form of being 
dissociated from formal processes of signification and delivered over 
to the viewer in self-exhibition. 
24 
In the state of exception, which I have discussed as a fictional 
space, the breakdown of norms creates a situation in which violence 
escapes management. Benjamin writes that "violence, when not in 
the hands of law, threatens it, not by the ends that it may pursue, but 
by its mere existence outside of the law."73 Violence, as a normal and 
legitimate operation, is reduced to a state of "mere existence" when 
it is dissociated from official sanction. As discussed in the case of the 
iustitium, "necessity" becomes the operative mechanism that 
guarantees the legitimacy of violence in a juridical void as it binds 
the self-preservation of the citizen to the self-preservation of the 
state. In the following discussion of 24, I want to present the show as 
a play between the tensions of legitimate and illegitimate violence in 
the state of exception. For those unfamiliar with 24, it is centered on 
the character Jack Bauer, a member of the CTU (Counter Terrorist 
Unit). The novelty of the show is its use of real time. Each episode is 
one hour (approximately 42 minutes after commercials), and it 
represents that hour in real time, while each season is twenty-four 
hours. The show is premised upon the ticking bomb dilemma.74 At 
the beginning of every season, Jack Bauer uncovers an insidious 
terrorist plot (assassination attempt, nuclear bomb, virus, etc.), while 
the viewer follows his exploits in real time. Predictably, the show 
becomes almost a vehicle for the exhibition of torture and, at the 
same time, a mechanism for ensuring a perpetual bond between 
violence and the law. As a result, the character of Jack Bauer begins 
to approximate the anthropogenic condition of the animal. 
In The Open, Agamben seeks to understand "life" as a result of a 
series of divisions between animal and man. Because life cannot be 
readily defined, it appears that, for this very reason, it "must 
73 Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 281. 
74 Jane Mayer, "Whatever It Takes: The Politics of the Man Behind 24," The New 
Yorker, 
http:/ fwww.newyorker.comjreporting/2007 /02/19/070219fa_fact_mayer?prlntable 
=true. 
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ceaselessly be articulated and divided."75 Historically speaking, 
"Man" is "always the place-and at the same time, the result," of 
these divisions.76 Every attempt to articulate man implicates a re-
zoning of the terrain of animal and vice-versa. This interminable 
articulation culminates in Heidegger's concept of the "open" as the 
proper dwelling place for Dasein. Heidegger's attempt to map the 
terrain of the openness of Dasein forces him each time in tandem to 
ground the animal in the "not-open."77 It is no accident then that ~is 
method and terminology begin to resemble that of the ecologtst, 
Jacob von Uexkall.78 
Uexkall was interested in the possibility of translating the 
perceptions of animals in their own "phenomenal world or the self-
world of the animal."79 The agency (effector world) and perception 
(perceptual world) of the animal are to be understood as a clo~ed 
system, the Umweft.BO The animal is bound within a field of specific 
stimuli, or "carriers of significance (what Heidegger calls, 
'disinhibitors')," that serve as perceptual and effector cues to the 
organism. For example, the Umwelt of a tick is comprised of a small 
series of cues (butyric acid, heat) to which the receptor and effector 
organs of the tick respond.s1 The "poverty" of this tiny world of 
receptor /effector cues "guarantees the unfailing certainty of her 
actions," Uexkall writes, "and security is more important than 
wealth."82 
According to Heidegger, the open is the place in which the 
animal is "exposed [to Dasein] without disconcealment."83 Animals 
are situated within a coordinate system of cues and are impotent to 
deactivate them. Humans are the ones who witness this poverty and 
even more, arrive at the closedness of animality by means of 
subtraction, or "destructive observation."84 In order to contain his 
desire to inflict pain for the sake of his own self, 24 throws Jack 
75 Giorgio Agamben, The Open trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2004), 13. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 79. 
79 Ibid., 67. 
79 Jacob von Uexkall, "A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book 
of Invisible Worlds," In Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept, ed. 
Claire H. Schiller (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1934), 5. 
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Bauer into a whirlwind of events that manages his desires and 
organizes acts of violence within the constraints of the necessary 
circumstances. Hegel states that work is "desire held in check."85 And 
while jack is a member of the CTU~ his activities are not solely linked 
to his "work~~ at the CTU administration~ nor are they carried out 
under its guidance. This is a characteristic feature of the show. Jack 
evades orders and official protocol. During the early part season one~ 
CTU agents investigate him even as he continues his own 
investigations. In one scene~ he actually resigns from the CTU so that 
he can torture a man for information.86 He isn~t bound to the law by 
virtue of its institutions or decrees~ but to necessity~ which the law 
claims as its own. He traverses a field of effector /receptor cues in 
which he is held in captivation and suspense. Time constrains his 
actions and expiates him of guilt. The show's creators wanted to give 
their characters~ "no time to think in ordinary terms because the 
dilemmas they face are so overwhelming."B7 
The element of time allows latitude in the numerous torture 
scenes that have invited criticism as well as popularity. I am not 
going to talk specifically about the torture scenes here~aa as they are 
a source of much media discussion. Critics tend to accuse the show of 
portraying excessive violence or using unrealistic or improbable 
situations to endorse the exhibition of violence. But such critiques 
fail to appreciate the truly "novel" aspects of the show~ in terms of its 
production as well as its moral value. In the case of the latter, 24 puts 
into play the mythic "force of law" that intercedes at the limit point of 
juridical competence. The limit point is the crisis that motivates and 
sustains the plot. By consigning jack Bauer to the closed place of 
animal innocence and captivation and aligning his self-security to 
85 From the chapter "Lordship and Bondage," in G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. 
trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 118. 
86 joel and Robert Cochran Surnow, "12:00am-1:00am," in 24 Season 5 (television 
broadcast) (United States: Fox Network, 2001). 
87 james Surowiecki, "Confessions of a 24 Writer," Slate Magazine 2006. 
http:/ fwww.slate.com/id/2134395/ (Accessed 3 june, 2008). 
88 Richard Kim, "Pop Torture," The Nation 2007, 
http:/ fwww.thenation.comjdocj20051226/kim (Accessed 2 june 2008); Andrew 
Buncombe, "US Military Tells jack Bauer: Cut out the Torture Scenes ... Or Else!," The 
Independent 2007, http:/ fwww.independent.co.ukjnewsjworldjamericasfus-military-
tells-jack-bauer-cut-out-thetorture-scenes--or-else-436143.html, (Accessed 12 
November 2007), Bill Keveney, "Fictional'24' Brings Real Issue of Torture Home.," USA 
Today, March 13 2005. http:/ fwww.usatoday.com/lifejtelevisionjnews/ 2005-03-13-
24-torture_x.htm (Accessed 23 May 2008). 
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that of the law~s~ the producers of the show can endlessly inscribe 
violence into the plot and~ at the same time~ guarantee the "moral~~ 
coloring of such violence. Walter Benjamin described "mythic 
violence" (lawmaking violence) in terms of Classical mythological 
archetypes in which violence is not simply a means towards some 
end~ but a "manifestation/' of lawmaking power itself.89 And while 
jack's actions are always in accordance with the end goal of averting 
a terrorist attack~ his actions are almost always unmediated by 
official sanction. In season 51 he uncovers a plot linked to the U.S. 
President90 He kidnaps the president in a feigned attempt to get a 
confession. Throughout the series~ the CTU is ridden with internal 
strife and suspicion of inter-departmental espionage. And then of 
course, the acts of torture are technically illegal. In other words, Jack 
Bauer deploys a juridically formless kind of violence carefully 
orchestrated within a field of crisis and captivation through which 
we see the specter of "force of lawn in which the violent act occurs as 
an exception to the norm, but nonetheless acquires legal "force" at 
the moment of application. 
24 enacts a truly mythic characteristic of sovereign violence: the 
agent of extra-judicial violence maintains his innocence. Executive 
producer Howard Gordon remarked, "jack is this really tragic 
character ... He's really the walking damned. He can't have the life the 
rest of us have. He kind of bleeds for our sins."91 The concept of jack 
as hero-martyr has a new meaning in the Western literary tradition. 
The term "tragic" must be seen in contrast from its Classical use. 
Hegel, in his study of Greek tragedy, warns of associating innocence 
with the Greek tragic hero, and, for that matter, determining that 
innocence upon the hero's restrained subjectivity. "For [the Greeks],~~ 
he states, "the bond between the subject and what he wills as his 
object remains indissoluble ... No worse insult could be given to such 
a hero than to say he acted innocently. It is the honor of these 
characters that they are culpable."9Z The plight of the hero, 
according to Benjamin, "invalidate[d] the ancient rights of the 
Olympians" and broke "the hold of demonic fate" from the hun1anity 
that revered him (or her).93 In other words, the tragic hero of the 
09 Benjamin, "Critique of Violence," 294. 
90 Surnow, "12:00am-1:00am." Season 5 
9 Ljoe Rhodes, "The Longest Day Enters the Hardest Season," The New York Times, 
December 5 2004. 
92 G. W. F. Hegel, The Hegel Reader, ed. Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998), 464-65. 
93 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. George Steiner (New 
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Greeks performed the rites of liberation fro m the very "demonic fate" 
that constrains jack Bauer. By constructing the character in such a 
way, the producers are able to localize violence onto a single 
character, but at the same time, remove the character from the 
ethical, legal, or moral responsibility of those acts. Hence we can 
watch the application of sovereign violence that is wholly divested 
from a corporeal place of origin: a specter of sovereign power within 
the state of exception. When jack Bauer states, as a prelude to a 
torture, "I need to do whatever is necessary to stop this nuke from 
being used against us,"94 he is articulating the bond by which the 
state of necessity ties the subject's self-p reservation to the 
sovereign's, annexing the violence of the former to the latter. When 
he tells a policewoman, "Cops have to play by the rules. I have to 
break a few with this guy,"9S and, even more, when he resigns from 
the CTU so that he can torture a suspect, he is br idging the state of 
exception to the rule, ensuring the continui ty of law. And where 
violence threatens to become an object fo r jack's own use, he 
assumes the silent gesture of guil t on his face that, in tandem with his 
mantra, "what needs to be done," divests him of his last vestige of 
will and returns to him an impotent, if fleeti ng, token of "humanity." 
Tellingly enough, this very sentiment is echoed by General Patrick 
Finnegan, who, in a cri tique of the scenes of tor ture, stated 
hesitantly, "The disturbing thing is that although tor ture may cause 
jack Bauer some angst, it is always the patriotic thing to do."96 
Time is an invisible protagonist in the show, and it dually 
consigns jack Bauer as well as his watchers, to an inoperative 
position. In the case of jack, he is captivated in a fi eld of 
effector /receptor cues that motivate his actions while holding his 
own being-for-himself in check. The viewer is bound in time to a 
perceptual world centered the Umwelt of jack. At times the fi eld is 
divided, showing multiple subject worlds in simultaneous time. 
Either way, the viewer is fully engaged to a world that is fully 
disengaged from his or her intervention; at the same time, the world 
that engages the viewer-- jack's world-- is "exposed without 
disconcealment." This isn't to say that 24 is radically different from 
the medium of film in general, but the difference is of degree, not 
York: Verso, 2003), 109. 
94 Surnow, "12:00am-1:00am." 
95 Joel and Robert Cochran Surnow, "3 :00am-4:00am," In 24 Season 1 (television 
broadcast) (United States: Fox Network, 2001). 
96 Buncombe, "Us Military Tells Jack Bauer: Cut out the Torture Scenes ... Or Else!." 
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kind. One luxury of watching film is the fact that a narrative can play 
out in summary time. This is even more so in literature, where the 
procession of silence is impossible. As a production, we are given 
precisely that which we were intended to see. 
In his discussion of cinema, Gilles Deleuze contrasts what he 
calls a "movement-image" to a "time-image." The former contains its 
own description (like an ostensible gesture of emotion) and, as such, 
is not subordinate to time. The latter is contained in and through 
time, exemplified in post-World War II cinema in which the seque~ce 
of frames was commensurable with real-time perception. According 
to Deleuze, the perception of the time-image in contemporary 
cinema is a radical departure from that of the prior movement-
images, because, while the latter references a thing outside of. the 
image, and thus requires the cognitive intervention of the subject, 
the former, as it represents time directly, leaves no room for such 
intervention.97 The radical passivity involved in viewing the time-
image of cinema implicates a new form of subjectivity that does not 
necessarily correspond to activity, but to "pure perception." 98 In 24, 
the "moral" function of time corresponds to its sequencing. Jack's 
actions do not necessarily reference norms, institutions, or decree~; 
he dispenses "justice" outside of the law, which opens up an anomie 
and contestable space that is immediately annexed to state of 
necessity. The manifestation of pure lawmaking power is p~stured 
onto the pure manifestation of time. Because such power IS no.n-
referential, it is made real, as a representation, through Its 
irreducible presence. In 24, time is not allowed to escape, b~ca.use 
within it and through it, the state of exception occurs. The tickin~­
bomb dilemma can never be "resolved" in a forma l sense, because It 
requires a moral judgment in a place that does not cite morality, but 
only exhibits itself as pure event in the irreducible duration of tim~. 
Deleuze suggests cinema constitutes a forn1 a perc~ption 
"anterior to all significance," upon which signification is possible.99 
f b. · 'tylOO th t At the same time, he implicates a new form o su JectiVI a 
recognizes itself through the pure duration tin1e.101 This subjectivity 
is vested with a form of perception originary to signification. How 
97 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Caleta 
(Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 271. 
90 Temenuga Trlfonova, "A Nonhuman Eye: De leuze on Cinema," Substance 33, no. 104: 
Special Section: Contemporary Novelist Lyd ie (2004): 139. 
99 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 262. 
100 Ibid., 4 7. 
101 Ibid., 87. 
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can a subjectivity so attached to a cinematic experience precede that 
experience? For that matter, why is the act of viewing so attached to 
this subjectivity? To answer this, I will come back to the discussion of 
the "open" via Heidegger's metaphysics of boredom. 
Heidegger identifies boredom as the condition in which Dasein 
achieves its place in the open, but, paradoxically through this 
process, comes to occupy the "closest proximity" to the world of the 
animaJ.loz "In becoming bored, by something," Heidegger observes, 
"we are precisely still held fast by that which is boring, we do not yet 
let it go, or we are bound to it for whatever reason."l03 Or, as 
Benjamin states, "We are bored when we don't know what we are 
waiting for."l04 Boredom is a force that draws us and, at the same 
time, refuses to reveal that to which we are drawn. The animal, 
which is held in captivation to its disinhibitors (receptor I effector 
cues), begins to coincide with Dasein, who is held in captivation by 
boredom. "In becoming bored," states Agamben, "Dasein is delivered 
over to something that refuses itself exactly as the animal, in its 
captivation, is exposed in something unrevealed. "Jos Rather than the 
open being radically distant from the animal world, it is found "only 
by means of a suspension and a deactivation of the animal relation 
with its disinhibitor."106 Through this "destructive observation" 
something like an "open" is realized. 
Deleuze, in his search for a pure subject, finds common ground 
with Heidegger in his search for the "open." Heidegger can only 
locate the open through the metaphysics of boredom, which, in turn, 
brings Dasein into the "closest proximity" with the animal, and 
Deleuze can only grasp "pure perception" in close proximity to the 
experience of cinema. In both cases, the object of observation is both 
captivating to and captivated by an "emancipated" subject whose 
being-as-such is vested within a duration of time. To Heidegger, this 
duration carries the subject being held in suspense by boredom, 
while to Deleuze, time is residually present in a subjectivity · given 
over to pure perception. Both of these thinkers "arrive" at the 
authentic subject through a process of subtraction, grounding the 
102 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, 
Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 92. Cited in Agamben, The Open 62. 
1o3 Agamben, The Open 62. 
104 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 150. 
10s Agamben, The Open 65. 
106 Ibid., 68. 
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subject to an irreducible form of being that evades representation. 
The animal that stands exposed before Dasein guarantees a mutual 
and non-exchangeable relation of presence, that is, "animality" is 
always the being-exposed-before-Dasein. The animal, whose 
presence is always represented to Dasein in exposure opens up the 
possibility of an authentic presence of non-exposure for Dasein, that 
is, a presence not given over to re-present activity. The subject who 
is given over to the cinematic experience shares this same relation of 
presence, in that "pure perception" is given over to virtual 
representation of that perception on the screen, leaving the residue 
of a subject ontologically present in and through the duration of the 
experience. Cloverfield and 24 are unique, but are perhaps also 
representative amongst film. They also demonstrate the impulse by 
which artistic production seizes upon the elemental, irreducible, and 
exceptional forms of being and offer them up to knowledge as 
representations. The "shock" becomes a principle of poetic 
production, formalized in film, leaving the residue of an involuntary 
subject that Baird identifies through the startle effect. His subject is 
grounded in activity, barely perceptible in time, while Deleuze's 
subject is grounded in inactivity, present in time. Cloverfield captures 
the former and 24, the latter. These two subjects are perhaps two 
sides of the same coin, the product of a tradition that sought the 
authenticity of being through imminence on one hand, and that of 
transcendence on the other. This operation functions at a normative 
and political level as well. In structuring the plot onto the irreducible 
duration of time, and structuring the actions of Jack Bauer within a 
"disinhibiting ring," the state of exception is given over to the moral 
world as an object of perception. The incompossible presence of the 
de-serial, singular event and the witness to the event -the state of 
exception and the rule-- is overcome in a relationship of mutual 
suspension and captivity. 24 opens up a world fully vested with its 
own self-referencing in terms of both morality and mere 
signification. The being-moral and the being-animal of Jack Bauer 
collapse onto his own person, stripping away the very possibility of 
signification upon which the distinction of the two are possible. The 
viewer is left with a form of life and law that can only reveal itself in 
and through the pure duration of time, and in the act of revealing 
itself, holds the viewer in suspense and captivation. If "boredom is 
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the threshold to great deeds," as Benjamin thinks,107 cinema erects a 
screen at that threshold. 
V. FESTIVAL OF MOURNING 
According to Agamben, anomie feasts such as funeral 
processions of the emperor and Carnival originated from the 
iustitium mentioned above. The legal declaration of iustitium in a 
state of siege brought about the possibility of pure anomie unleashed 
in the city. It carried over to the funeral rights of the sovereign. 
Violent riots followed the death of Caesar, for instance, but, over 
time, the death of the sovereign became an occasion for public 
mourning.1oe The rupture of legal continuity, which was embodied in 
the sovereign, was "ritualized and controlled, transforming the state 
of exception into public mourning and mourning into iustitium.109 
The anomie license attributed to celebrations like Carnival can be 
seen as the ordering of the exception into the juridical sphere, 
ensuring its continuity through the ritualized spectacle of legal 
transgression.11° Cloverfield, 24, and perhaps the entire spectrum of 
entertainment constitute our celebrations of power and the anomie 
festivals that bridge the gap between the death of the sovereign and 
the reinstitution of its legacy. In Cloverfield, we witness the 
catastrophic space, opaque to legal representation, strategically 
restored upon the constituted order. At the same time, it 
emancipates the life that dwells in catastrophe-- that is, the life that 
binds itself to itself in terror-and gives it over to the world as a 
representation. The film celebrates the triumph of a biopolitical 
struggle that, in one of modern democracy's great aporias, "put the 
freedom and happiness of men into play in the very place-'bare 
life'-that marked their subjection.111 jack Bauer, on the other hand, 
is the tragic hero of our time. He "solves" the endless debates on 
torture and the ticking bomb by casting aside contingency. Benjamin 
noted of Baroque tragedy, "The prince, who is responsible for 
making the decision to proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at 
the first opportunity, that he is almost incapable of making a 
decision."112 jack Bauer arrives to intercede at these moments. At 
101 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 105. 
1oa Agamben, State of Exception, 70. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., 71. 
111 - --, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 11. 
uz Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 71. 
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the same time, his poverty in the world guarantees that his violence 
will be contained within the law, which claims necessity as its own. 
Even more, the gap that separates the pure event of necessity from 
the determinateness of the law is traversed by our own perceptual 
field that holds us captive in the "closest proximity'' to the 
captivation of jack Bauer. Thus, we have mutually captivated 
subjects, in which the captivation of the one founds that of the other. 
)EFF GRIFFIN received his BA in History from the University of 
Kentucky. His interests include 19th-20th century European history, 
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0MAR KHADR IS NOT HARRY POTTER 
"Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." 
-George W. Bush 
" ... the world isn't split into good people and Death Eaters. " 
-Sirius Black 
The twinning which is the subject of this paper first arose simply out 
of the observation that media coverage of Omar Khadr frequently 
noted his love of the Harry Potter stories1. Khadr discussed Potter at 
length with fellow Guantanamo prisoners, his lawyers, UN prisoner 
advocates, even his interrogators2• The fictional hero's triumph over 
institutionalization, exploitation and evil must have resonated with 
the adolescent Afghani Canadian, captured on an Afghani battlefield 
in 2002 when he was fifteen. Deeper consideration of the two child 
soldiers reveals startling differences in the wars which formed them. 
0MAR KHADR'S DEFENSE CANNOT BE HARRY POTTER'S DEFENSE 
Harry Potter belongs to an old-fashioned sort of conflict and his story 
is at heart a familiar bildung in which the hero develops what he needs 
- combat skills, eloquence, the ability to lead both by example and by 
inspiring others - to succeed at a necessary task which he alone can 
complete. In the process of developing those skills, at the age of 
fourteen, Potter is forced to meet his nightmarish enemy in a 
graveyard. He first defies Voldemort and then fights: "he was going to 
die trying to defend himself, even if no defense was possible"3. Because 
of Potter's resolve to protect himself, he lives. 
1 C. F. 60 Minutes, Friscolanti, Shephard Guantanamo's Child, etc. 
2 Michelle Shephard, Guantanamo's Child: The Untold Story ofOmar Khadr. (Toronto: 
John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 107,174, 175, 194. 
3 Ibid., 575. 
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